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Abstract
In this thesis I theoretically investigate the impact of capital gains taxes on the 
market response to public information. There are two objectives: First, I employ 
the model in Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) to investigate the extent to 
which differential tax rates on short and long-term capital gains and losses affect 
equilibrium price and trading volume response to public information disclosure 
(both 'good’ and ‘bad news’) about the value of a risky asset. Second, I examine 
whether capital gains taxes affect the information content of equilibrium prices 
with respect to public information disclosures. In particular, 1 modify the 
Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) model to include exogenous random supply 
of the risky asset and examine whether asymmetric tax treatment of short and 
long-term capital gains and losses affects the extent to which market prices 
reflect public information about the value of the risky asset.
The results indicate that differential tax rates cause equilibrium prices to 
be more sensitive to public information disclosures. In addition, they result in 
lower (higher) trading volume around public disclosures when there is a price 
increase (decrease) due to the magnified tax costs (benefits) associated with 
realizing a short-term gain (loss). Moreover, differential tax rates cause prices to 
be, on average, more sensitive to exogenous noisy supply of the risky asset. The 
results also suggest that the noise effect outweighs the information effect so that 
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